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For Lent I gave up writing book reviews. Most readers will assume that such a 
decision hardly demanded a sacrifice, but they would be sadly mistaken, for I am 
currently suffering from a malaise common to post-prelim graduate students 
know as DAH (pronounced "duh")--Dissertation Avoidance Hysteria. No cure 
currently exists for DAH, and so those of us who suffer from it must resort to 
treating the symptoms: frequent headaches, uncontrollable stuttering when que-
ried about either the topic of our dissertations or progress recently made, and 
unbounded enthusiasm for any and every project that may divert us from our 
appointed task. And so in order to survive a disease that can easily metastasize 
and infect every area of one's life (and which in some cases is terminal), I've 
taken to popping aspirin, practicing silence and eschewing the writing of book 
reVIews. 
That is, I did so until I read Stanley Hauerwas's latest offering. 
I should perhaps explain, since the reasons for ending my self-imposed mora-
torium, even at great risk to my future well-being, might easily be misinter-
preted. I decided to write this review not because I believed Hauerwas's most 
recent musings were so profound that I simply had to get the word out. Nor did I 
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undertake this project merely to be able to add yet another entry to my impres-
sive list of publications appearing in prestigious journals. Rather, I embarked on 
this mission because Hauerwas taught me an important lesson: that Christians 
are called to be a people who have (or create) time for the trivial. This insight 
(to which I will later return) struck me as so revolutionary that I decided to in- . 
corporate it into my way of life. Hence, when I was approached by the editor of 
this journal to offer some reflections on Christian Existence Today, I thought to 
myself: "How better to embody concretely my new found appreciation for and 
commitment to the trivial?" 
Before I proceed to important matters, perhaps I may appropriately begin 
with a somewhat trivial aside. As his students know, Hauerwas refers to this col-
lection rather affectionately as Christian Existence Yesterday, since the editor of 
Labyrinth Press (who will remain anonymous) possessed the manuscript for no 
trivial amount of time before he was able to bring it out. Of course, Hauerwas 
was inhibited from asking for a title change, for to have done so would have ob-
scured his allusion to Barth's short tract, Theological Existence Today. Some 
cynical readers, undoubtedly, will deny that the two works have anything in com-
mon ("I knew Karl Barth. Karl Barth was a fr iend of mine .... "). The one possible 
exception might be the length of time taken to write each: Barth makes no secret 
that his work was written over a single weekend. 
Concerning more important matters, let me begin by noting that, not surpris-
ingly, many of the issues that arise in this latest collection of essays are those 
which Hauerwas's readers have come to expect: virtue, narrative, practical rea-
son, moral formation and peace. But it would be a mistake to assume from this 
that CET is merely another attempt by Hauerwas to use these notions to launch 
his latest diatribe against the poverty of American Christian ethics. Rather, like 
most of us, the more be writes about these matters, the more clarity and preci-
sion be attains. Since Hauerwas rightly believes that thinking and writing should 
normally not be distinguished, those who have read his works to this point have 
had the opportunity to "see" him think through these issues. Hauerwas readily 
admits that his "project" remains unfinished (and is therefore inadequately char-
acterized as a "project"), and whatever advances it provides depend on the dia-
logical character of his discourse. That is, Hauerwas, more than some authors, 
wants and needs his readers and critics. This willingness to allow others to look 
over his shoulder stems from his belief that having the right "position" or "an-
swer" is not enough; a person must be clear about how she got there. Otherwise, 
there is no way of knowing whether one has arrived at "the same" position or 
not, or whether one has arrived anywhere at all. None of this, of course, is meant 
to imply that Hauerwas's latest book finally clarifies everything; however, there 
are several aspects of his thinking that are presented with a good deal more lu-
cidity, and as such have the potential to help us understand more clearly what 
Hauerwas is about. Perhaps the biggest payoff of such clarity is that it may make 
it possible for us to know better how to have a disagreement with him. 
Of course, Hauerwas would approve of this, for he is in the business of engen-
dering disagreement. Hence, it is quite fitting that Hauerwas introduces his lat-
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est collection by responding to the now well-known accusation leveled by his for-
mer teacher and long-time friend, James Gustafson. For those unfamiliar with 
the details, Gustafson accuses Hauerwas of succumbing to the so-called "sectar-
ian temptation." This temptation, according to Gustafson, stems from the fact 
that Christianity's identity is threatened by the pluralism that marks contempo-
rary societies. As a result, this threat naturally generates a conservative, or sec-
tarian, reaction that attempts to regain a distinct sense of identity for Christianity 
by resorting to a strategy of "sectarian withdrawal." This withdrawal is but-
tressed by Hauerwas and others whose theoretical positions, according to Gus-
tafson, entail "theological fideism" and "sociological tribalism." 
Hauerwas acknowledges that part of his reason for beginning with his dis-
agreement with Gustafson is to provide a touchstone for the remainder of the 
book; that is, readers will be able to test his "defense" of his position in the in-
troduction against the constructive proposals that are displayed throughout the 
book. But perhaps more importantly, Hauerwas's introduction reminds readers 
that what is at stake in reading and responding to arguments is not so much "de-
fending'' this or that "position"; rather, it is coming to understand that persons 
are often "captured" by certain habits of mind and life that deeply affect the way 
they see the world. Thus, Hauerwas shows his readers that to disagree with Gus-
tafson involves not merely denying the latter's charges of sectarianism, tribalism, 
fideism, irresponsibility and the like, but more basically coming to conceptual 
clarity about why Gustafson "sees" the problems in these terms to begin with, 
and subsequently, why one perhaps might want to deny Gustafson's descriptions. 
In short, Hauerwas's introduction helps the reader understand one of the pri-
nary philosophical issues that Hauerwas variously displays throughout his book: 
trguments, including moral arguments, cannot be separated from the descrip-
ions that not merely accompany them, but make them possible. Hence, moral 
trgurnent often entails the complex process of persuading an audience that they 
1eed not, perhaps even must not, accept the first stage of any argument; indeed, 
ierhaps the only stage necessary to throw into relief what is at issue, is rede-
cription. 
So Hauerwas carefully sketches out in his introduction, and then further sug-
ests in his later chapters, why he rejects Gustafson's characterization of his po-
tion. Hauerwas begins by admitting that if bis "position" is a temptation, he 
::>pes people will succumb to it; however, he rejects Gustafson's notion that giv-
.g in to such a temptation necessarily opens one to the charge of "sectarian-
m." Hauerwas rightly notes that such a charge begs the very epistemological 
1d sociological questions that are at issue, while appearing to stand above them. 
other words, the charge of sectarianism often serves as a cipher for little more 
an "you are wrong not to take responsibility for the world in the way that I 
1." In other words, such a charge serves to mask the fact that how the Church 
.derstands and exercises its responsibility to the world is precisely the point at 
ue, and one on which Hauerwas has written at length. That Hauerwas is weary 
having those arguments summarily dismissed as "sectarian" is evident in bis 
ssionate rebuttal to those who have leveled such charges: "Show me where I 
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am wrong about God, Jesus, the limits of liberalism, the nature of the virtues, or 
the doctrine of the church--but do not shortcut that task by calling me a sectar-
ian" (p. 8). 
Similarly, Hauerwas argues that Gustafson's charge of " irresponsibility" 
wrongly presupposes that Christians must take up an "all or nothing" attitude 
toward a "given" society. That Hauerwas rejects such a view is attested to by one 
of the themes that runs throughout this collection (and many of bis other writ-
ings): That part of what the Church is called to be is a people of virtue capable 
of making judgments about what it can and cannot affirm about the society in 
which it finds itself. "The issue," Hauerwas asserts, "is how the church can pro-
vide the interpretative categories to help Christians better understand the posi-
tive and negative aspects of their societies and guide their subsequent selective 
participation" (p. 11). Such interpretive categories, in turn, are only "available" 
if the community sustains certain practices that are capable of throwing into re-
lief those aspects of a society which they cannot affirm. For example, Hauerwas 
believes that Christian communities must denounce the state's willingness to re-
sort to violence, but they can only do so to the extent that they embody that vir-
tue which is essential for their life and witness to the world, the virtue of peace-
making. 
Although Hauerwas has written much on this in the past, his brief essay 
"Peacemaking: The Virtue of the Church" contains perhaps his most clear and 
succinct thinking on why this virtue must remain integral for all communities 
who purport to follow Jesus. This essay, which consists of his extended reflec-
tions on Matthew 18:15-22, helpfully displays the relationship between the virtue 
of peacemaking and a theological understanding of who Christians believe them-
selves to be as members of communities that attempt to follow Jesus. Under-
standing such a relationship requires seeing the connection between a commu-
nity's call to live as forgiven people and the fact that to the extent to which it 
commits itself to the truth, such a community will necessarily engender conflict. 
Hauerwas recognizes that the difficult question is how to conjoin in one commu-
nity those two seemingly irreconcilable practices: on the one band, that each 
Christian community is called to be that place where forgiveness is always avail-
able; and on the other hand, that each community, in calling its members to ac-
countability to the truth of Jesus Christ, is called to make judgments that often 
exacerbate conflict. That these two practices appear irreconcilable is itself, Hau-
erwas suggests, indicative of the problem. Part of the problem stems from the 
fact that our notion of "peace" is seldom theologically informed; that is, our no-
tion of peace is often indistinguishable from that truncated view of peace as the 
complete absence of conflict, that "false peace of the world which is too often 
built more on power than truth" (p. 95). Such a notion hinders us from recogniz-
ing that genuine peacemaking cannot be separated from the practice of speaking 
the truth; however, such truth-speaking is directed not first of all to the world, 
but to ourselves. Such a posture has the potential to transform the nature of con-
frontation both within and without the community, for it reminds us that "we 
confront one another not as forgivers, not as those who use forgiveness as 
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power, but first and foremost as people who have learned the truth about our-
selves--namely, that we are all people who need to be and have been forgiven" 
(pp. 93-94). 
Hauerwas also helpfully illuminates the Christian virtue of hope in his essay 
(written with Thomas Shaffer) entitled "Hope Faces Power: Thomas More and 
the King of England." This essay serves as a powerful example of a point that 
Hauerwas never fails to emphasize: Theological/moral judgments cannot be 
made in the abstract, but require that a people malce discriminations in concrete 
situations. That such is the case is one reason Hauerwas spends so much energy 
exploring the relationships between character, virtue and the story of a particular 
people. But what Hauerwas does in this and several other essays throughout this 
collection is to display these relationships with an illuminating concreteness that 
stems from his ability to weave together theological/moral reflection and per-
sonal narrative. That is, by telling More's story in a particular way, Hauerwas 
had greatly enriched our theological/moral imaginations by helping us see how 
inseparable were More's life and his theological/moral commitments. 
These above-mentioned essays are but two examples of how themes which 
have held a prominent place in Hauerwas's thinking--peacemaking and hope--
continue to be fleshed out in this latest collection. What is perhaps most encour-
aging about this fleshing out is how Hauerwas has gone about doing it. First, I 
think it is fair to say that in his latest offering Hauerwas has virtually stopped 
talking about "narrative" as an abstraction and has increasingly moved toward 
!ngaging particular narratives, a strategy which has allowed him to exhibit pow-
:rfully how it is that these narratives are essential to argument. Similarly, Hauer-
vas tends to say less these days about "virtue" in the abstract and more about 
pecifically Christian virtues--that is, more about how the story of Jes us and 
hose who follow Him makes a difference to how these virtues are construed by 
nd embodied in particular communities. Equally promising is that both of the 
bove trends have made it possible, indeed necessary, for Hauerwas to engage 
10re directly with Christian Scripture. 
It is tempting to offer further specific comments about other essays in the col-
ction, such as how Hauerwas talks about practical reason in ways that might 
.alee it possible to rehabilitate casuistry as a legitimate Christian moral practice; 
>W his recurrent theme of moral formation looks when he reflects on the place 
· "formal" education, and especially so-called "Christian" education; or how his 
1derstanding of "character" plays out when it is directed toward the character 
those who have a special call to be ministers of the gospel. But I'll resist such 
notating, which might mislead some people into thinking that they needn't 
id the book, and concentrate the remainder of my reflections on what is per-
ps the most provocative and suggestive theme that runs throughout these es-
1s: the theme of time. 
Somewhat ironically, that the issue of time flows as a persistent undercurrent 
oughout these pages is a tribute to the positive influence of Gustafson. In fact, 
! might go as far as to say that the prominent place which the issue of time 
; in Hauerwas's thought is unintelligible apart from Gustafson's reflections on 
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the relationship of time and community, particularly as Gustafson displays it in 
several chapters (and in the appendix, which is a summary of Gustafson's disser-
tation) of Treasure in Earthen Vessels. In short, Gustafson argues that time is 
constitutive of community in that the latter is such only insofar as it is a commu-
nity of language, of interpretation, of memory and understanding, and of belief 
and action. Each of these constitutive aspects of all human communities (includ-
ing the Church) are thoroughly infused by temporality; that is, they are pene-
trated throughout by the dialectical forces of the past, present and future. 
That Hauerwas has learned these lessons well hardly requires substantiation. 
Regular readers of Hauerwas need only be reminded of the prominent place of 
concepts such as narrative, description, remembering and conviction, to see how 
thoroughly Hauerwas has internalized the important place of time in any discus-
sion of community. The central issue for any such discussion is that of continuity 
and/or identity over time. As Gustafson notes, there are usually important 
analogies between how one understands the self and time and how one under-
stands community. But Hauerwas, perhaps more than most of the philosophers 
whom Gustafson deals with, attempts to integrate more fully the dialectical rela-
tionship between the self and community, both of which are thoroughly im-
mersed in time. One of the ways Hauerwas keeps the dialectic operative is by 
insisting that community is prior to the self; that is, it is a mistake lo start from a 
construal of the self and then move to an understanding of community. Hence, 
with regard to the self and its continuity /identity over time, Hauerwas suggests 
that no such continuity/identity is possible apart from that selfs "character" and 
its ability to situate itself coherently within a narrative (which may amount to the 
same thing)--both of which are irreducibly communal. Likewise, Hauerwas's 
concern for the continuity of self and community over time is the reason for his 
emphasis on virtue, for "the virtues bind our past with our future by providing us 
with the continuity of self' (p. 265). With regard to the continuity /identity of the 
Christian community over time, Hauerwas points first of all not to the "charac-
ter" of the Church, but to the faithful character of God as most fully revealed in 
the story of Israel and Jesus of Nazareth, and as remembered, embodied and 
performed by those who have been called to radical discipleship. Hence, all of 
the categories that have become the hallmark of Hauerwas's work--character, 
narrative, memory, virtue--all are attempts to make connections between the 
selfs communal nature and the community's irreducibly temporal character. 
But it may well be that Hauerwas has pushed the importance of time even 
further than did Gustafson, or at least in directions which the latter never seri-
ously considered. This is particularly the case with Hauerwas's emphasis on the 
"eschatological" character of Christian communities, a category about which he 
remained somewhat oblique in his earlier writings, but about which he is noY 
beginning to demonstrate some lucidity. This emphasis surfaces, for example, i1 
his insistence that salvation involves the "creation of a timeful people" (p. 50 
whose existence on behalf of the world creates "a space and time in which w 
might have a foretaste of the Kingdom" (p. 106). 
The notion that salvation involves the creation of a timeful people is criticc 
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for Hauerwas for several reasons. First, it avoids the problem with many "classi-
cal" theories of the atonement, which, by framing the discussion of salvation by 
means of the abstract category of "atonement," malces it possible, if not neces-
sary, to spealc of salvation apart from the community which such salvation cre-
ates. Such theories tend toward gnosticism in that they suggest that salvation in-
volves little more than God's "work" and our knowledge of it. But Hauerwas in-
sists that salvation is not simply a matter of knowledge, of knowing that we are a 
people who are "saved"; rather, salvation involves being saved "to" something (a 
new people) which is inseparable from, indeed simply is, salvation itself. 
Second, by emphasizing salvation as the creation of an eschatological commu-
nity, Hauerwas suggests that it may not be possible to know what salvation 
means apart from such a community; that is, it may be that salvation is so closely 
tied to what it means to be such an eschatological community--a community 
whose very life together is an important, albeit an insufficient, expression of the 
presence of the Kingdom--that one should not, perhaps cannot, frame the issue 
of salvation apart from participation in such a community. Said in a different 
way, Hauerwas reminds us that salvation must reach to the very core of what it 
means to be human, which, without appearing to "essentialize" what we mean by 
the "human," can be affirmed to be irreducibly temporal; that is, all that we 
"are" (or hope to be) is inextricably connected with the fact that we belong to 
communities of language, of interpretation, of memory and understanding, and 
of belief and action, all of which are thoroughly infused with temporality. So 
whatever else salvation may be, Hauerwas is right to suggest that God cannot 
truly "save" us while ignoring the fact that we need to be redeemed from the 
tyrannies of time that enslave us. We need a "new" time. But any " time" that 
will really be "new" must necessarily involve the "redemption" of our language, 
nterpretations, memories, beliefs, actions, and the like. (This, I take it, is part of 
,..hat Hauerwas means to imply by the title of one of his essays: "The Church as 
:Jod's New Language.") Because this is the case, Hauerwas is right to insist that 
ucb a new, eschatological "time" cannot come to us apart from a community 
hat is involved in the very temporally-infused activities noted above. Thus, we 
annot be saved from the tyranny of time apart from the creation of a " timeful" 
eople, a people who institute a new, escbatological relationship to time. 
Finally, by emphasizing the "timeful" and therefore communal nature of sal-
ttion, Hauerwas bas perhaps done us the greatest service by "historicizing" 
hat salvation must be in twentieth-century America. It is not enough simply to 
y that what it means to be human is irreducibly temporal, for how humans ex-
:rience time in a given culture is all important. While I cannot do justice here 
the complex structures of time instituted within modern capitalist societies, 
rhaps it is enough to be reminded of how such societies encourage a calculat-
and economizing attitude toward time. The fact that we speak of time as 
nething we can spend, save, waste, use and buy is only one indication of bow 
:h societies transform time into another, if not the most valuable, commodity. 
t that Christians have been redeemed is another way of saying that they have 
!n brought into a community that embodies the truth that time is ultimately a 
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gift. A people whose lives are marked by this gratuitousness can "afford" to take 
time for the trivial, for they have been freed from the tyranny of thinking that 
their ultimate destiny and happiness is tied to how they "spend" their time. This 
freedom makes it possible for a "new'' time to appear, a time for caring for 
those who do not promise to make the world a better place, a time for being 
with those who do not promise to contribute to our status, a time for entering 
into the gratuitous and joyful worship of a God who does not promise that things 
will always work out " right." 
Of course, to the extent that Christian communities fail to embody such re-
demption, that is, to the extent that they fail to embody such freedom from the 
tyranny of economized time, their redemption/sanctification remains seriously 
incomplete. But to the extent that they engage in practices which challenge this 
reigning view of time, we may confidently assert that there the kingdom is break-
ing in, there the eschatological is being realized. 
Hauerwas has many more provocative things to say about time, such as its in-
timate relationship to peace, and its ability to create the "space" necessary to 
resist the totalitarian powers that would drain our lives of their meaning. But 
perhaps I have pointed to enough to suggest how potentially integrating such an 
understanding of time might be. In short, we can thank Hauerwas for helping us 
to see how we might move away from thinking of the distinction between Church 
and world primarily in spatial categories. By suggesting that much of what is im-
portant about this crucial distinction is missed when we fail to construe it in tem-
poral categories--as the distinction between two aeons, as Yoder puts it--Hauer-
was has given us much to consider, not the least of which is one more reason to 
doubt those who accuse him of sectarianism. Such charges, which are usually 
coupled with accusations of "withdrawal,'' are so closely bound to spatial meta-
phors that they fail to account for the temporal dimension. In other words, if the 
first thing one wants to say about the distinctiveness of the church is not that it 
inhabits a different "space," but that its life is ordered by a new time, then it 
becomes difficult to see what sense the charge of "withdrawal" makes. If such a 
shift in emphasis is one of Hauerwas's goals, then he has made some important 
headway; however, given such an objective, Hauerwas might have been wise to 
choose a subtitle that didn't appear to trade on the very spatial metaphors he 
wishes to minimize. Furthermore, he might consider giving us more help in see-
ing how the spatial and temporal are connected. One place where he has begun 
to do this well concerns his understanding of hospitality: because Christians live 
with a different relationship to time, they have the freedom to welcome the 
stranger into their "space." We can only hope to see more connections along 
these lines in the future. 
Since it seems unlikely that Hauerwas will quit writing books anytime soon, 
perhaps it may be worth taking a few moments to suggest, rather presumptu· 
ously I suppose, what else we might hope Hauerwas will do in the coming years 
As noted above, Hauerwas seems to be at his best when he combines two differ· 
ent elements: closely reasoned argument and narrative depiction. For example 
Hauerwas is both provocative and stimulating when he takes up a suggestive re 
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mark by someone like Yoder, spells out the "philosophical" arguments entailed 
by Yoder's remark in a more deliberate manner than Yoder either needs or 
cares to do, and interweaves such "abstract" work with a story that provides ma-
terial for theological imagination. Hauerwas has different ways in which he does 
this, sometimes using a story to introduce the issues at stake (such as his discus-
sion with a philosopher about school prayer), sometimes using a narrative to 
frame the whole argument (such as his essay on Thomas More), other times us-
ing the stories more as exemplifications of the more abstract arguments he has 
adduced (such as his use of Olin Teague as an example of practical reasoning 
within a concrete community). What makes these examples so impressive is not 
so much that Hauerwas knows how to do both things at once (although he does 
and many of us probably don't), but that they help us see that both are argu-
ment; that is, that these are merely two necessary moments in any discussion 
that seeks to be illuminative. So, in any future work, we can only hope that Hau-
erwas continues to make the most of this gift. 
As far as enigmas that remain in his work, one general area may be alluded 
to. In the introduction to this collection, Hauerwas suggests that Christians 
should withdraw their support from civic republicanism only when that form of 
government or society resorts to violence to maintain order and external society 
(p. 15). This is a theme that Hauerwas has sounded before. While readers may 
find themselves in agreement with Hauerwas in principle, it remains for him to 
help readers see what resources are available to help "form" people in such a 
way that making such discriminations is possible. Hauerwas would be the first to 
admit that making discriminations about what counts for violence is no easy mat-
ter (and certainly cannot be made in the abstract), but it seems that it is precisely 
at this very difficult juncture that we are left on our own. Furthermore, Hauer-
was has not yet explored the implications for his understanding of violence and 
peace once it is recognized that much of the violence which enslaves us and oth-
ers is what has been called "symbolic violence." What makes such violence so 
pernicious is that it exerts its power without resorting to physical coercion. What 
practices and strategies might Christians engage in to create the space possible 
to live without such violence? 
Similarly, Hauerwas may have to help his readers even more in coming to see 
what kind of community will be necessary for this kind of formation to take 
place. For example, while some readers will no doubt resonate with Hauerwas's 
contention that "at times and in some circumstances Christians will find it im-
possible to participate in government, in aspects of the economy, or in the edu-
cational system" (p. 15), others may find the whole notion of "participation" 
here so vague that their imaginations are stymied when they attempt to consider 
how they might do otherwise. Admittedly, that many of us may find ourselves 
incapable of such imaginative forays is perhaps less a function of Hauerwas's 
;hortcomings and more a reflection of our own captivity to particular habits of 
mind and life, yet such an admission hardly gets Hauerwas off the hook; it simply 
means that he may have to keep arguing what he's been arguing for a long time 
)efore anyone can really hear what he's saying, or more importantly perhaps, be-
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fore anyone will know what to do or be if they discern that what he's been saying 
is true. 
Now, Hauerwas both would and would not want us to take alJ of this (or our-
selves) so seriously. After all, reading books, writing reviews, conversing with our 
friends, sharing a meal, jogging at noon--these are perhaps trivial matters, and 
yet they are of tremendous ethical importance, particularly to the extent that 
they create the time (and peace) necessary for us to live as a redeemed people, 
which may entail nothing less than having the freedom to go on joyfully doing 
things like the above even when it seems like we should be directing all our ener-
gies to more urgent matters. Of course, bringing all of this to your attention 
probably only serves as a reminder; after all, I would expect that readers who 
have endured this article are no doubt already consummate connoisseurs of the 
trivial. 
